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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
   
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




   
 




SHAKEY HOOVER, a/k/a SHAKIE SCOTT, 
 a/k/a DAVID SHEPPARD, 
             Appellant 
      
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(District Court No. 2-17-cr-00525-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler 
      
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
on August 30, 2021 
Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
(Opinion filed: September 2, 2021) 
   
 
OPINION* 
   
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
Shakey Hoover appeals the District Court’s denials of his suppression and new-trial 
motions.  For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




In April 2017, police responded to an incident in which Hoover allegedly pointed a 
gun at an acquaintance outside the multi-unit building where he lived.  According to a 
responding officer, Hoover’s girlfriend led police inside the building to a hallway in a 
common area just outside his unit.1  There, in a hole in the wall, police found a gun that 
matched the description of the one Hoover allegedly used.  It had one of Hoover’s 
fingerprints on it.  
A federal grand jury indicted Hoover on one count of possession of a firearm by a 
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  He moved to suppress the gun, contending 
that law enforcement’s search of the common areas of his building violated the Fourth 
Amendment.  The District Court denied the motion.    
Hoover then proceeded to trial, where he and the Government stipulated that he had 
been convicted of a crime punishable by more than a year’s imprisonment.  The jury 
ultimately found him guilty.  Several months later, Hoover moved for a new trial under 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.  He argued that the stipulation as to his felon status 
was insufficient to support his conviction under Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 
(2019), which was decided after his trial.  The District Court denied that motion as well, 
 
1 Hoover appears to dispute whether his girlfriend actually consented to the officers’ entry 
into the building.  But we agree with the District Court that consent is immaterial to our 
analysis because, as we explain later, he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the building’s common areas. 
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and later sentenced Hoover to, among other things, 120 months’ imprisonment.  He now 
challenges the Court’s denials of both his suppression motion and his motion for new trial.2 
II.  
A. Suppression Motion 
Hoover first renews his argument that the District Court erred in admitting into 
evidence the gun that police found in a hallway outside his rental unit.  Yet he conceded 
before the District Court that police found the gun in a common area accessible to all 
tenants in the building.  That is fatal to his claim. 
To invoke the Fourth Amendment’s protections successfully, Hoover must show 
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched.  United States v. 
Correa, 653 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2011).  And we have squarely held that a resident in a 
multi-unit building does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in common areas of 
the building.  Id. at 190–91; see also United States v. Acosta, 965 F.2d 1248, 1252–53 (3d 
Cir. 1992).  Hoover, seemingly conceding that the law is not on his side, argues that these 
cases create an unconstitutional bright-line rule that does not consider the totality of the 
circumstances.  We disagree.  And in any event we are bound by previous precedential 
panel decisions absent en banc review.  3d Cir. I.O.P. 9.1. 
 
2 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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B. Motion for New Trial 
Hoover also argues the District Court erred in denying his Rule 33 motion for new 
trial.3  We agree that his trial was deficient under Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at 2200, as the 
Government failed to prove that he knew he was a felon (meaning someone who was 
convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison) at the time he possessed 
the firearm at issue.  See Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2095 (2021).  But because 
Hoover did not make that objection at trial, we review for plain error only.  See United 
States v. Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 531 (3d Cir. 2010) (applying plain-error review to an 
objection raised for the first time in a post-trial motion). 
In this context, a defendant must show (among other things) that, but for the Rehaif 
error, “there is a reasonable probability that he would have been acquitted.”  Greer, 141 S. 
Ct. at 2097 (internal quotation marks omitted).  But “[i]f a person is a felon, he ordinarily 
knows he is a felon,” id., and Hoover has no evidence that his case is extraordinary.  He 
points only to a psychological evaluation concluding that he has some diminished mental 
capacity.  The evaluation demonstrates, however, that he remembered many details of his 
criminal record, including multiple multi-year prison sentences.  App. at 5 (noting, among 
other things, that he recalled receiving at least two three-year sentences and being 
incarcerated “from 2007 to 2013”).  As Hoover does not have any other supporting 
evidence, and his presentence report confirms his felon status, he cannot show a reasonable 
probability that the jury would have acquitted him.  See Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2098 (noting 
 
3 He contends on appeal that his motion for new trial was timely despite having been filed 
after the ordinary deadline for such motions.  Because his motion fails on the merits, we 
assume (as the District Court appears to have done) that it was timely. 
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that we “may consider the entire record” on plain-error review, “including information 
contained in a pre-sentence report” (emphasis in original)). 
*    *    *    *    * 
 We thus affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
